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Abstract— It is very difficult to calculate in advance the positive 
and negative long-term impacts of an sustainable investment, or 
a development venture. A serious global problem arises from the 
fact that numerous environmental-protection oriented private 
and government ventures are implemented in an incorrect 
manner significantly impair the conditions of both the 
environment and the economy (market). There is a high number 
of innovative energy related investments, waste and water 
management projects, etc. in Europe, which cause more harmful 
effects then was earlier. 
 Various sustainability logics can be synchronised with the 3×3×3 
Rubik’s Cube’s solution algorithms, and the relations of the 
cube’s sides define a planning strategy that provides a new 
scientific approach for investment planning. We theoretically 
evaluated the various solution processes, and paralell investment 
planning levels following the solution levels and stages of the 
cube. After these various level-evaluations, we made „low-carbon 
interpretation” summaries. According to the hypothesis on the 
solution algorithms of the Rubik’s Cube, the parts rotated next 
to each other, meaning the project attributes which have an 
impact on each other, have a relation system which can be 
defined in mathematical terms, therefore, their point of balance 
(e.g. Nash’s) can also be determined by Game Theory models 
(games of finite kind, zero sum games, oligopolistic games, etc.). 
In this paper, we would also like to prove that the hypothesis 
which states that the solution algorithm of Rubik’s Cube, namely 
the “Layer by layer” method, can be used to model the process of 
project development. Also, the correspondence system of project 
attributes can be represented by the proper Game Theory 
models. This way, the various enviro- and climate-friendly 
investments can be realized in a well-plannable, low-risk 
economic environment regarding both human resource planning 
and the preserving and advancement of environmental criteria. 
 
Keywords— Game Theory interpretations, Rubik’s Cube 
method, Sustainable planning and practice, Environmental 
modelling, Solution algorithms, Low-carbon interpretation,  
Introduction 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The low-carbon project planning (1) and project 
development using Rubik’s Cube is a specially constructed (2) 
planning concept which – as of now – is a one of a kind 
concept that can interpret factors with an impact on processes 
in 3D (3). For “setting” the equilibrium point of the 
economical or resource-usage of input and output sides, and to 
describe the relation between them, we used Game Theory 
solutions which weren’t used for this purpose during scientific 
research before.  
Used before the process of modeling, the evaluation of the 
process of tolerance in the sense of engineering means the 
determination of the allowed maximum differentiation from 
the determined sizes, quantities or qualities. In the case of 
Game Theory algorithms, we researched the following: which 
method is the same as the solution process model of Rubik’s 
Cube in terms of its attributes, and in what scale does it differ 
from it while still remaining representative. For the Game 
Theory algorithms we were searching for, we used the process 
of tolerance, meaning we was researching the admissible 
differences between the attributes of the cube and the 
parameterization of the Game Theory functions. 
During the complex modeling, we analyzed the Game 
Theory models one by one, and through the process of 
modeling We assigned the relevant models to the various 
rotation algorithms (interpretations). we separated the attribute 
groups of the cube to three different aggregations, which are 
INPUT side attributes, MIDDLE CUBE side attributes, and 
OUTPUT side attributes. We used Game Theory methods to 
determine the points of equilibrium between the three attribute 
groups. The gist of this was that where the attribute elements 
were tagged with a “not allowed difference” by the SMART 
(Simple Multi Attribute Ranking Technique) analysis, we 
listed parameters which lead to the points of equilibrium 
(Nash equilibrium) through strategic models. Both the 
analyses and the modeling were conducted via a three-stage 
system; therefore we also conducted the Game Theory 
modeling of the entire process on three levels, meaning the 
matching of three different types of Game Theory models (or 
three different cost-functions). 
The Game Theory payoff functions referring to the various 
modeling levels were made by analyzing the attributes of the 
Input side, the middle cube, and the Output side, which were 
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tagged with a “not allowed difference” by the SMART 
(Simple Multi Attribute Ranking Technique) analysis in their 
respective attribute groups, which we took and optimized as 
sustainability strategies interpreted in a business environment. 
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS  
 
Imaging algorithms of Input-side, the project begins in this 
phase. We can find the answer to the following question: what 
do we have to keep in mind when starting a project? The 
incorrect rotation of the first layer, or row of cubes, results in 
incorrect continuation, therefore, we can’t approach the next 
layer. We can easily explain this with a simple energy-
transaction. If we change our initial energy-supply system in a 
way that the old one still has a life expectation of 20-40% of 
its estimated use duration, then we may end up with a 
considerable financial loss if we intervene. To avoid ending 
up in such a situation, we can use e.g. a Nash equilibrium to 
calculate the optimal intervention time. 
 
III. RESULTS 
 
A. Game Theory modeling of input side (Level 1) 
Enviro-orientated developments are fundamentally against 
the economic development priority system (e.g. the program 
for lowering greenhouse gases and for the use of fossilized 
energy sources contradict each other, since the former 
promotes the minimization of energy consumption, while the 
latter promotes the increased use of pollutants). When 
planning the first layer, this can be used in the process of 
project planning in terms of regulation policy and financing 
policy (Figure 1). We also have the same situation concerning 
the water base defense and the rising requirements of favored 
water-dependant energy plants. In case of various projects, we 
have to include the criteria of non-cooperative competitors as 
well for the sake of realizing clear business regulations and 
sustainable business strategies. In this situation, it is incredibly 
hard to find the Nash equilibrium, but it is imperative 
nevertheless since the project can’t be further developed in a 
controversy.  
 
Definition:  
By the definition for the Nash equilibrium: 
At the equilibrium point of a  n-
member game or strategy, we classify a point (strategic n), 
where  
 
, …, , …,  
 
holds true not strictly for every i=1,…..,n player. Therefore, 
the point of equilibrium is called a Nash equilibrium. 
Thesis: 
Following the completion of the first layer, only the 
connection with a Nash equilibrium can be further developed, 
meaning that we can only rotate the cube further from this 
position. The first layer always correlates with the second 
layer’s middle cube, and can only be the same color.  
 
 
Figure 1: Equilibrium point for the first row or layer (circled), where the 
middle cube is always the same colour (illustrated by the lines). 
Source: Fogarassy, 2014 (4) 
Proof: 
Let = ( be one point of equilibrium for the 
game. In this instance, in case of any given  
:  
 
from where, through simple addition, it is obvious that 
φ(x^*,x^*)≥φ(x^*,y). Based on this, a well-performing 
algorithm can be provided to define the points of equilibrium 
which have an impact on planning and to solve the fixed 
problems of the aggregations.  
Example:  
During the planning of biomass-based renewable energy 
production, whether the high amount of water consumed can 
have a detrimental effect on the project’s profitability and can 
become the criteria for use of the most effective technology is 
a critical point (5). Therefore, the question and the criteria is 
viewed as strictly technological in nature, and we try to match 
the strategy and Game Theory optimum with the corner cube 
which has 3D attributes (colors are red-green-white), where 
white means input, red means regulation criteria, and green 
means technological solutions, which we handle collectively 
(Figure 2). 
 Luckily, solving water distribution problems plays a 
major role in Game Theory solutions, but we can usually 
reach the points of equilibrium that provide criteria for the 
outlines of an assured system usage only through defining 
many intricate function-correspondences, calculating 
mathematic correlations for which is quite difficult. Multi-
purpose water usage and the interests and cost-functions of 
those connected to it offer different optimums, which usually 
suppose a game of multi-player and nonlinear nature, and yet 
which is somehow still a non-cooperative game based on 
some kind of Nash equilibrium. 
 To define the problem – according to the low-carbon 
developments using Rubik’s Cube – I made a three player 
optimization regarding water usage for the process of strategic 
planning using Rubik’s Cube, based on the guide by Molnár 
(1994) (6). 
 Multi-purpose water usage as a decision-method task 
has been a problem for decades, and one with many solution 
options. In our case, we’re searching for one on a non-
cooperative three-player (agricultural consumer (for 
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irrigation), industrial consumer (for cooling), and household 
consumer (for functional uses)) Nash equilibrium (7). The 
central element of the low-carbon strategy problem is how the 
agricultural (biomass producer) water usage project developer 
will decide whether the project has enough water out of the 
resources at hand. 
 
Figure 2: 3D attributes of “white-green-red” corner cubes (with White-Green-
Red/WGR colors), the technological solution that assures payoff (optimized 
for three-person water usage) (Dimensions from left to right: SMART value, 
Cube type and dominance, Main agent inherent attributes) 
Source: Fogarassy, 2014 (4) 
The problem has three dimensions, where the Rubik 
solution is the issue of the input side. The basis of water usage 
can be water, underground water, and purified wastewater. Let 
k = 1,2,3 be the three players who can follow variations of 
decision during their decision phase as follows:  
The strategy for each player can be described by a five 
variable vector:  
 
 
where 
fk = 
local 
water 
tk = local 
underground 
water 
kk = purified 
wastewater 
fk
 
= 
import 
water 
tk
 
= import 
underground 
water 
 
 
The payoff function for the total amount of water used for 
each player is as follows en:  
 
     
 
All players have two common complicating criteria, one of 
which states that the amount of used water may not be less 
than the minimal requirement D_k^min, while the other states 
that it may not be more than the maximum requirement of 
technology (D_k), either. (These sustainability criteria are to 
avoid wasting water.)  
 
 
 
 
In addition, the agricultural player (k=1) has to introduce 
two additional criteria for water usage, which have the 
following variables:  
G  = group of plants exclusive to underground water 
ai  = rate of plants (i) by entire agricultural area 
wi  = water-dependence of plants (i) by hectare  
T = group of plants which can be watered with purified 
wastewater 
 
 
 
We know that the underground water supply offers the best 
quality water while purified wastewater offers the worst, so 
we have to define the volume of plants (sensitive) in the 
agricultural portfolio which can’t be watered with purified 
wastewater. The water requirement which draws solely from 
the underground water sources may not exceed the water-
dependence of the plants which are exclusive to clean, quality 
underground water:   
  
 
 
the equation converted to linear form: 
 
 
 
where   
 
Similarly, the rate of use and availability of purified water 
can also be modeled. The water requirement for purified 
wastewater may not exceed the total available amount, either. 
This correspondence gives the volume of plants that can either 
only or also be watered thus (e.g. plants for energy use).    
 
 
 
equation converted to linear form: 
 
 
 
where   
 
For the other players, we similarly have to define the 
correspondences of the functions defined by complications, 
for which the system can be found in the cited publications, 
before adding numeric data. 
 
In light of the above facts, it can be stated that if we design 
our agricultural systems for the use of biomass as energy by 
allocating the complicating energy source (in this case, water) 
into an equilibrium state right at the beginning with Game 
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Theory methods, then the planning process is also applicable 
to the sustainability criteria system. The actual result of the 
entire analysis can be one of the following: either we won’t 
over-calculate water usage (over-calculate, as in the allocation 
won’t be disproportionate), or we will discard the project 
entirely because it doesn’t abide by the sustainability criteria, 
since if it’s clear at this point that the amount of water at hand 
is insufficient to reach the Pareto optimal production state, 
then the shortage of water causes a water-deficit in the 
analyzed system.  
 
B) Defining input and output connections with Game 
Theory correlations 
 
Game Theory modeling of middle cube connections (level 
2) - keeping the middle cube in position and solving the row 
or layer imitates the zero sum game, since the position of the 
middle cube cannot be changed, so it serves as a fix point for 
the rotation of the other cubes. Their position is fixed 
(meaning they can’t be rotated out of their position, or 
correspondence systems) and their defined value elements can 
be considered constant (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Zero sum games are always illustrated with the fixed middle cube 
(circled), which serve as criteria for the optimization of edge cubes (two 
colours). 
Source: Fogarassy, 2014 (4) 
Definition: 
A  game with  players is called a constant sum game, 
if the sum of the wins and losses of the player is a constant , 
regardless of strategy.  
 
Formula:  
 
 
 
Where , the game is zero sum.  
 
Thesis:  
With the zero sum game, we do a constant sum 
optimization because the resource has a limited sum due to the 
fixed point trait; therefore, the goal is to harmonically divide 
the resources at hand, and we search for the point of 
equilibrium of the attribute group (Figure 4). During the 
SMART analysis, we verified that the orange middle cube of 
Rubik’s Cube shows a “not allowed difference” attribute. 
Currently, the inherent attribute group of the orange side is the 
monetary value of the project, and the time needed for payoff. 
The analysis of this trait with Game Theory optimization 
methods shows us how the fixed resources of the low-carbon 
project will optimize themselves into a Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
Figure 4: Prohibited attribute of the SMART analysis (time for payoff, value 
of project is not in equilibrium with the other attributes) 
(Title: Middle Cube, Dimensions from left to right: Usefulness, SMART 
value, Value score) 
Source: Fogarassy, 2014 (4) 
 
The imbalance on Figure 4. can be ascribed to the 
insufficiency of the stability of external factors which have an 
impact on the payoff of the investment. We have to analyze 
the circumstances of market entry of the newcomer. 
It isn’t easy to solve the problem if there are attributes in 
the group which are non-market elements (externals) but 
nevertheless have an impact on the time required for payoff 
(e.g. tax- and regulation policy, pollution control, foreign 
currency policy, etc.).  
  
Proof: 
I defined the points of Nash equilibrium for the middle 
cubes of Rubik’s Cube (four different fixed attributes) by 
searching for the attributes which aren’t part of the Pareto 
optimal state.  
 player constant sum games can be used to demonstrate 
the points of equilibrium for the four different attributes.  
If we take a  point of equilibrium, we 
can define that 
 
 for every    
.  
and 
 for every 
. 
International Journal of Advanced and Innovative Research (2278-7844) / # 4 / Volume 3 Issue 10
    © 2014 IJAIR. All Rights Reserved                                                                                                     4
and 
 for every 
. 
and 
 for every 
. 
 
The game is zero sum, therefore 
 
 
The second equality goes as follows 
 
 
For either attribute to get a “not allowed difference” tag, as  
 
 
 
 
Prevalent for a constant sum game’s every strategy as 
follows: 
 
 
The point of equilibrium of the four player constant sum 
game ceases, if a shift in strategy happens for either of the 
factors: 
 
 
thus the shift in strategy (the change of any element of 
strategies) leads to inequality, 
 
 
 
This inequality-system states that if player one chooses a 
strategy different from  and thus leaves the  
equilibrium and the game itself, his payoff-function can only 
be either equal to or lower than that of the others. If the fourth 
player differs in a not allowed manner but the others don’t 
change their strategies, then his payoff-function will also be 
equal to or lower compared to the  of 
the others. 
 
 
 
Since this is a zero sum game, meaning the total payment 
can neither get higher or lower, the payoff-function of the 
 factors will either be equal to or greater 
as well. 
 
Imaging algorithms of Output-side 
One of the popular types of non-cooperative Game Theory 
solutions is conflict alleviation methods. From these, we can 
highlight the axiomatic solution system of Nash, which 
creates axiom aggregations in order to assure the solution 
always places on the Pareto-line. The Kálai-Smorodinsky 
solution defines the minimum reachable or the last available 
point (meaning worst acceptable) to the solution of the 
conflict by defining the worst possible leaving point of the 
conflict.  
 
 
C) Game Theory modeling of output side (level 3) 
The phase of setting the final equilibrium state by the 
corner switch on the leaving side, the equilibrium search, and 
the finalization of the sustainability criteria can usually only 
be done with cooperative strategy. 
 
Definition: 
Cooperative games can be defined by the following 
concepts.  as in aggregation of players, 
where the  subset is known as a coalition: . Let  be an 
aggregation of the subsets, meaning the aggregation of 
possible coalitions. The  main aggregation is called coalition 
total.  
 
Thesis:  
In low-carbon investment concepts, the project generates 
energy drawn from renewable sources, but the produced 
electricity can only reach the consumer if the owners of both 
the green electricity producer (Investor/B) and the electricity 
system (System/H) agree with each other that the product 
reaches the consumer through the system. A criterion of 
cooperation is that the investor pays a usage/transport fee to 
the owner of the system, and the owner acknowledges that 
instead of the previous (fossilized) product, he transports a 
private product via the system, and in a lower volume. As 
compensation, the system gets the pay from the investor. This 
compromise, in essence, means that there has to be a valid 
agreement on provisioning conditions on the market. We tried 
to match the “green-yellow-orange” attribute cube of the 
previously established Rubik’s Cube project planning method 
with the model, and to assign the proper strategy to the 
cooperation.  
 
Proof:  
We can introduce our conflict-alleviation method with a 
two-player game. In the example, let the players’ strategies be 
represented by  and , and the two payoff-functions by 
. The aggregation of possible payoffs will 
therefore be 2D, and can be shown as follows: 
 
 
 
In this case, as always, the payoff of both players aims at 
maximization, but naturally the various payoffs of one player 
depend on that of the other and the fact that raising one 
player’s payoff will lower the other’s stands as a rule. 
Therefore, the objective is to find a solution that is acceptable 
to both the investor and the system owner, meaning both 
parties simultaneously. We also have to state that in case of 
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the agreement not being “signed,” both parties get a lower 
payoff, or a punishment. 
 
 
 
 
Standard representations:  
 
 
this will be our standard payoff vector, where we assume 
that there is a  where , and . 
The problem is defined mathematically with the pair. This pair 
was defined in Figure 5. We also assume that aggregation H is 
not open, convex, or bounded, so in the case of: 
  
 
 and bounded in both coordinates, meaning  
 
 
in case of  . 
 
 
Figure 5: Figure of conflict state with the position of the payoff-function 
Source: Fogarassy, 2014 (4) 
We also assume that the borderline of H is the graph of a 
 function, which is strictly falling in  and is 
concave. The graph of function  is usually called the 
Pareto line; therefore, the conditions of satisfying the 
optimum criteria of sustainability can be met here. We must 
also take into consideration with the game and solution 
criteria that no rational player will accept a compromise that 
means a worse payoff than the payoff without agreement. 
This way, we can tighten the payoff aggregation as follows: 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We concluded an unorthodox Game Theory optimum 
search on the different (cube) levels for the low-carbon 
planning of the project development process. During the 
Game Theory optimum search, we defined a theoretic model 
structure, which means fundamentally placing three different 
types of Game Theory solutions after each other, while 
keeping tabs on which Game Theory method is most efficient 
for featuring the various economic criteria systems: 
 
1. Cube level one: non-cooperative three player game 
(for the correction of not allowed differences on 
Input side), 
2. Cube level two: non-cooperative zero sum game (for 
the correction of not allowed differences of middle 
cube connections), 
3. Cube level three: conflict alleviation method with 
two player game (for the correction of not allowed 
differences on Output side). 
 
The three different Game Theory models can together 
define the states of Nash equilibrium required during project 
development, which help achieve sustainability during the 
realization of the project. The sufficient selection of Nash 
equilibrium is possible through the SMART value definition 
based on the correspondence system of the cubes. An 
introduction to this will be given later in this document. 
However, we must stress that the Game Theory row that we 
selected (three person cooperative game, non-cooperative zero 
sum game, conflict-alleviation method) is applicable mainly 
for typified energetic development, and a strictly defined 
economic environment (Hungary and Central Eastern Europe). 
Therefore, we can say that economic externals or development 
goals that differ from these can allow different Game Theory 
sequences to be used as well.    
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